Understanding PA 26-37 in Plain Language

PAGE 14
(21) A local or regional board of education, provided the records are limited to educational records created or obtained by the state or Connecticut Unified School District #2, established pursuant to section 17a-37;PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING: 

A local school district may receive certain DCF records —
BUT only educational records that were created or obtained by:

• the state,
  or
• Connecticut Unified School District #2.

Connecticut Unified School District #2 is the school system that serves children involved in certain state-operated or institutional settings connected to DCF and related services.

In simple terms:

School districts can access some educational records connected to children in state/DCF educational systems —
but the records are supposed to be limited specifically to educational records from those systems.

Standing alone, this provision is narrower than many earlier disclosure sections because it includes a clear limitation.

It does NOT say:
“all DCF records.”

It says:
educational records created or obtained by certain state educational systems.

Now, some important observations.

First:
This subsection again highlights the overlap between:

• educational systems,
  and
• DCF-connected systems.

That overlap becomes especially important given the earlier subsection that explicitly redefined DCF as a “state educational authority” for FERPA purposes.

Second:
The limitation language matters.

Unlike some broader subsections, this one specifically narrows disclosure to:
“educational records.”

That suggests lawmakers recognized the sensitivity of broader DCF records.

Third:
Even so, critics may still focus on the fact that:
school districts and DCF-connected educational systems are increasingly intertwined throughout the bill.

Earlier sections already:

• created educational withdrawal reporting,
• authorized educational-record sharing with DCF,
• and integrated parent-managed-learning counts into statewide educational data systems.

This subsection continues that theme of interconnected educational/child welfare infrastructure.

Fourth:
The statute still leaves unanswered questions such as:

• how records are retained,
• how districts safeguard them,
• whether redisclosure limits apply,
• and how broadly “educational records” may be interpreted operationally.

And strategically, this subsection reinforces one of the broader criticisms opponents made:

The legislation repeatedly blends:

• educational administration,
• student records,
• DCF systems,
• and state oversight mechanisms.

Critics argue that cumulative blending fundamentally alters the traditional boundary between:
ordinary educational choice
and
child welfare intervention systems.

~~~~~~~

PAGE 14
(22) The superintendent of schools for any school district for the purpose of determining the suitability of a person to be employed by the local or regional board of education for such school district pursuant to subsection (a) of section 10-221d;

PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING: 

DCF records may be shared with a school superintendent when the district is deciding whether someone is suitable to be hired by the school system.

This relates to employment decisions for people working in public schools.

In simple terms:

If someone wants to work for a school district, the superintendent may receive certain DCF-related information to help determine whether that person should be employed around children.

Standing alone, this is fairly standard child-safety employment screening language.

Schools commonly conduct:

• background checks,
• abuse-registry reviews,
• and suitability screenings for employees working with children.

Now, some important observations.

First:
This subsection again shows that DCF information is not used only for:

• abuse investigations,
  or
• court proceedings,

but also for:

• employment suitability,
• licensing,
• and regulatory oversight.

Second:
The phrase:
“determining the suitability”
is broad.

That generally means districts may use the information to assess whether someone should be trusted to work with children.

Third:
This subsection reinforces a recurring theme throughout these statutes:

Once information exists inside DCF systems,
there are numerous pathways for that information to affect:

• employment,
• licensing,
• educational systems,
• court proceedings,
• and other governmental decisions.

Fourth:
In the context of the homeschooling bill, critics may pay particular attention to the repeated intersection between:

• DCF systems,
  and
• educational institutions.

Especially because earlier sections:

• redefined DCF as an “educational authority,”
• authorized educational-record sharing,
• and tied homeschooling withdrawal to DCF screening.

And strategically, opponents would likely continue making the broader cumulative argument:

The issue is not merely whether any single disclosure provision is reasonable inside child welfare law.

The concern is that the bill increasingly integrates ordinary educational-choice decisions into:

• DCF databases,
• interagency disclosure systems,
• and governmental oversight frameworks traditionally associated with:
•  investigations,
•  licensing,
• suitability determinations,
• and child protection enforcement.~~~~~~~PAGE 15
  (23) The Department of Motor Vehicles for the purpose of criminal history records checks pursuant to subsection (e) of section 14-44, provided information disclosed pursuant to this subdivision shall be limited to information included on the Department of Children and Families child abuse and neglect registry established pursuant to section 14 of 17, 17a-101k, subject to the provisions of sections 17a-101g and 17a-101k, concerning the nondisclosure of findings of responsibility for abuse and neglect;PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING: 

  DCF may share certain child abuse registry information with the Connecticut DMV when the DMV is performing background checks required under state law.

  BUT:
  the information shared must be limited only to information from the DCF child abuse and neglect registry.

  And:
  there are still legal confidentiality protections regarding some abuse/neglect findings.

  In simpler terms:

  The DMV can check whether someone appears on the DCF abuse/neglect registry for certain regulated purposes tied to licenses or employment.

  This is likely connected to jobs involving transportation or work around children.

  Now, some important observations.

  First:
  This subsection is narrower than many earlier disclosure sections.

  It specifically limits disclosure to:

  • registry information only,
    not
  • full DCF investigative files.

  That limitation matters.

  Second:
  The section references:
  “criminal history records checks pursuant to subsection (e) of section 14-44.”

  That means the DMV is not getting broad unrestricted access —
  it is tied to a specific statutory background-check process.

  Third:
  The phrase:
  “subject to the provisions…concerning nondisclosure”
  is important.

  It means even registry information still has confidentiality protections and limitations.

  Now, strategically, this subsection becomes very interesting when compared to the earlier homeschooling withdrawal provisions.

  Why?

  Because the homeschooling withdrawal section imposed consequences not only for:

  • substantiated registry placement,
    but also merely for:
  • being “currently under investigation.”

  That is significant.

  Here, in an employment/licensing context, the statute carefully limits disclosure and references nondisclosure protections.

  Yet earlier homeschooling provisions allowed educational withdrawal denial based on investigation status alone —
  before adjudication or substantiated findings.

  Critics would likely highlight that contrast heavily.

  They may argue:

  If the state recognizes strong confidentiality protections and caution regarding registry disclosures in professional licensing contexts,
  why is homeschooling withdrawal conditioned on mere investigative status without adjudication?

  That creates a potential proportionality and due process argument.

  Fourth:
  This subsection again reinforces the broader architecture critics identified:

  DCF registry systems are increasingly interconnected with:

  • licensing systems,
  • educational systems,
  • employment suitability determinations,
  • and interagency background-check infrastructures.

  And opponents argue the homeschooling provisions improperly inserted ordinary educational-choice families into that broader child welfare regulatory ecosystem.

  ~~~~~~~

  PAGE 15
  (24) The Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services for the purpose of treatment planning for young adults who have transitioned from the care of the Department of Children and Families;

  PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING:

  DCF records may be shared with the Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS) when helping plan treatment for young adults who were previously in DCF care.

  In simple terms:

  If a young person ages out of or transitions from DCF custody/services and needs mental health or addiction treatment, DCF can share relevant information with DMHAS to help coordinate care and treatment planning.

  Standing alone, this is fairly standard interagency care-coordination language.

  When young adults transition out of foster care or DCF involvement, agencies often need to coordinate:

  • mental health care,
  • addiction treatment,
  • housing,
  • and support services.

  Now, some important observations.

  First:
  This subsection again demonstrates how broadly DCF information can be shared across state systems once someone becomes part of the DCF infrastructure.

  The records may potentially flow into:

  • healthcare planning,
  • mental health systems,
  • addiction services,
  • courts,
  • law enforcement,
  • licensing agencies,
  • and educational systems.

  Second:
  The purpose limitation here is fairly specific:
  “treatment planning.”

  That makes this subsection narrower than some earlier broad disclosure provisions.

  Third:
  This provision also reflects how DCF operates not merely as an investigative agency, but as part of a large interconnected social-services network.

  Now, strategically, in the context of the homeschooling bill, this subsection matters less because of its specific content and more because it contributes to the cumulative picture.

  Critics repeatedly argued:

  Once educational withdrawal becomes tied to DCF systems,
  families potentially become connected — directly or indirectly — to a vast interagency information-sharing ecosystem spanning:

  • education,
  • courts,
  • healthcare,
  • licensing,
  • law enforcement,
  • and social services.

  And opponents argued that framework is fundamentally disproportionate when applied to families simply exercising constitutionally protected educational choice absent individualized adjudicated abuse or neglect.

  ~~~~~~~

  PAGE 15
  (25) The superintendent of a public school district or the executive director or other head of a public or private institution for children providing care for children or a private school (A) pursuant to sections 17a-11, 17a-101b, 17a-101c, 17a-101i, 17a-111b and 46b-129, or (B) when the Department of Children and Families places an individual
  employed by such institution or school on the child abuse and neglect registry pursuant to section 17a-101k;

  PLAIN  LANGUAGE MEANING: 

  DCF records may be shared with:

  • a public school superintendent,
  • or the head of a public/private institution or private school that cares for children,

  in certain child welfare situations.

  This can happen:
  (A) under various child protection statutes involving abuse, neglect, custody, or child welfare proceedings,

  OR

  (B) if DCF places an employee of that school or institution on the child abuse and neglect registry.

  In simple terms:

  Schools and child-serving institutions may receive DCF information when:

  • child protection laws require coordination,
    OR
  • one of their employees is placed on the abuse/neglect registry.

  Standing alone, this is largely employment safety and child protection coordination language.

  If someone working around children is placed on the abuse registry, the institution employing them may need to know.

  Now, some important observations.

  First:
  Notice how broad this is.

  It applies to:

  • public schools,
  • private schools,
  • and child-serving institutions.

  So DCF information-sharing authority extends deeply into educational and childcare systems.

  Second:
  The subsection specifically includes private schools.

  That is notable because earlier sections of the bill already:

  • formally defined “nonpublic schools,”
  • required attendance reporting,
  • and integrated nonpublic education into broader state reporting systems.

  Third:
  Subsection (A) references several major child welfare statutes again —
  including:

  • abuse/neglect investigations,
  • permanency planning,
  • and court intervention statutes.

  That reinforces how tightly connected these disclosure systems are to formal child welfare intervention structures.

  Fourth:
  Subsection (B) is especially important operationally.

  It means DCF may directly notify schools or institutions when an employee is placed on the child abuse registry.

  That demonstrates how registry placement can affect:

  • employment,
  • licensing,
  • educational institutions,
  • and professional status.

  Now, strategically, this subsection becomes very important in the context of the broader bill because it further blurs:

  • educational systems,
    and
  • child welfare systems.

  Critics would likely point out:

  The same bill:

  • created “parent-managed learning” tracking,
  • authorized educational-record sharing with DCF,
  • redefined DCF as an educational authority,
  • and expanded educational reporting structures,

  while simultaneously expanding or clarifying broad DCF disclosure pathways involving schools and educational institutions.

  That cumulative integration is exactly what many opponents found alarming.

  And one especially important constitutional/policy argument critics may raise is this:

  The bill increasingly normalizes the treatment of educational environments through child welfare surveillance and disclosure frameworks rather than treating educational choice primarily as a protected liberty interest under cases like:

  • Pierce v. Society of Sisters
  • Meyer v. Nebraska

  ~~~~~~~

  PAGE 15
  (26) The Department of Social Services for the purpose of
  (A) determining the suitability of a person for payment from the Department of Social Services for providing child care;
  (B) promoting the health, safety and welfare of a child or youth receiving services from either department; or
  (C) investigating allegations of fraud provided no information identifying the subject of the record is disclosed unless such information is essential to any such investigation;

  PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING:

  DCF records may be shared with the Connecticut Department of Social Services (DSS) for three main reasons:

  (A) To decide whether someone is suitable to be paid by DSS to provide childcare.

  (B) To help protect the health, safety, or welfare of a child receiving services from DCF or DSS.

  (C) To investigate fraud allegations.

  However:
  if the records are being used for a fraud investigation, identifying information should not be disclosed unless it is necessary for the investigation.

  In simple terms:

  DCF and DSS can share information with each other for:

  • childcare provider screening,
  • child welfare coordination,
  • and fraud investigations.

  Standing alone, this is fairly standard interagency social-services coordination language.

  DCF and DSS often overlap in:

  • foster care,
  • childcare subsidies,
  • family assistance,
  • and child welfare services.

  Now, some important observations.

  First:
  This subsection again demonstrates how broadly DCF information may potentially circulate across state agencies once it enters the system.

  The records may affect:

  • employment suitability,
  • subsidy eligibility,
  • investigations,
  • and service coordination.

  Second:
  Subsection (B) —
  “promoting the health, safety and welfare of a child” —
  is broad language.

  That kind of wording can provide significant discretion for interagency information-sharing.

  Third:
  Subsection (C) contains a partial privacy safeguard:
  identifying information should not be disclosed unless essential.

  That is another example where lawmakers recognized at least some confidentiality concerns.

  Fourth:
  This subsection reinforces a major theme running throughout these statutes:

  DCF records are not confined to narrow abuse investigations.

  They are part of a much larger administrative ecosystem involving:

  • licensing,
  • education,
  • courts,
  • law enforcement,
  • public assistance,
  • healthcare,
  • and regulatory oversight.

  And strategically, this matters in the context of the homeschooling bill because:

  Critics repeatedly argued the problem was cumulative.

  Not every disclosure subsection by itself is extraordinary within child welfare law.

  The concern is that the earlier educational provisions:

  • routed homeschooling withdrawal into DCF systems,
  • authorized educational-record sharing,
  • and linked educational status to child welfare infrastructure.

  Once that connection exists, families potentially become subject — directly or indirectly — to a very broad interagency disclosure and oversight network originally designed for:

  • abuse intervention,
  • welfare administration,
  • licensing,
  • and governmental child-services oversight.

  ~~~~~~~

  PAGE 15
  (27) The Court Support Services Division of the Judicial Branch, for the purpose of
  (A) determining the supervision and treatment needs of a child or youth or any other person, and provide appropriate supervision and treatment services to such child or youth or any other person, or
  (B) sharing common case records to track recidivism of juvenile offenders;

  PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING:

  DCF records may be shared with the Court Support Services Division (CSSD) of the Judicial Branch for two reasons:

  (A) To determine what kind of supervision, treatment, or services a child, youth, or other person may need.

  OR

  (B) To share case records for tracking repeat juvenile offending (“recidivism”).

  In simple terms:

  DCF information can be shared with the court system’s supervision and treatment division to:

  • assess people,
  • provide services,
  • supervise cases,
  • and track repeat juvenile offender patterns.

  Standing alone, this is fairly standard juvenile justice/court-services coordination language.

  CSSD handles things like:

  • juvenile probation,
  • diversion programs,
  • behavioral supervision,
  • treatment coordination,
  • and juvenile services.

  Now, some important observations.

  First:
  This subsection again demonstrates how DCF records may move directly into juvenile justice and court-supervision systems.

  That expands the downstream reach of DCF-connected information.

  Second:
  The phrase:
  “any other person”
  is broad.

  The statute is not limited strictly to juveniles themselves.

  That creates fairly expansive service/supervision authority language.

  Third:
  Subsection (B) specifically references:
  “sharing common case records to track recidivism.”

  That is important because it explicitly acknowledges:

  • integrated record-sharing systems,
  • cross-system tracking,
  • and longitudinal monitoring of juvenile offenders.

  Critics of broad governmental data systems often focus closely on this kind of language because it reflects coordinated multi-agency information infrastructure.

  Fourth:
  Standing alone, this provision is aimed at juvenile justice administration —
  not homeschooling.

  BUT —
  in the context of the earlier sections of the bill, critics argue it further illustrates the type of institutional ecosystem families potentially touch once educational withdrawal becomes tied to DCF systems.

  And strategically, this cumulative structure is what many opponents repeatedly emphasized.

  By this point, DCF-related information may potentially circulate through:

  • education systems,
  • courts,
  • prosecutors,
  • law enforcement,
  • licensing agencies,
  • social services,
  • mental health systems,
  • foster/adoptive systems,
  • and juvenile justice supervision systems.

  Critics therefore argue:
  the bill fundamentally alters the relationship between educational choice and state oversight by embedding homeschooling-related processes into child welfare and judicial infrastructures traditionally associated with:

  • investigations,
  • supervision,
  • intervention,
  • and delinquency management systems.

  ~~~~~~~

  PAGE 15
  (28) The birth-to-three program’s referral intake office for the purpose of
  (A) determining eligibility of,
  (B) facilitating enrollment for, and
  (C) providing services to
  (i) substantiated victims of child abuse and neglect
  with suspected developmental delays, and
  (ii) newborns impacted by withdrawal symptoms resulting from prenatal drug exposure;

  PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING:

  DCF records may be shared with Connecticut’s Birth-to-Three early intervention program in order to:

  (A) determine whether a child qualifies for services,

  (B) help enroll the child,

  and

  (C) provide services to certain children, specifically:

  • children who were confirmed (“substantiated”) victims of abuse or neglect and may have developmental delays,
    OR
  • newborns affected by drug withdrawal symptoms due to prenatal substance exposure.

  In simple terms:

  DCF can share information with early childhood intervention programs to help vulnerable young children receive developmental or medical support services.

  Standing alone, this is fairly standard early-intervention coordination language.

  Birth-to-Three programs are designed to help infants and toddlers with:

  • developmental delays,
  • disabilities,
  • or early medical/neurological concerns.

  Now, some important observations.

  First:
  This subsection is narrower and more targeted than many earlier disclosure provisions.

  It specifically limits disclosure to:

  • service eligibility,
  • enrollment,
  • and treatment coordination.

  Second:
  Unlike some earlier homeschooling-related provisions, this subsection requires:
  substantiated abuse or neglect findings for one category of children.

  That is important.

  Critics would likely notice that contrast immediately.

  Why?

  Because earlier homeschooling withdrawal restrictions applied not only to substantiated findings —
  but merely to:

  • active investigations,
    OR
  • registry status involving any adult in the household.

  Yet here, in a service-intervention context, the statute specifically references substantiated victims.

  That contrast may strengthen arguments that the homeschooling provisions were unusually broad and punitive.

  Third:
  The subsection involving newborn withdrawal symptoms reflects healthcare and developmental-intervention coordination rather than educational oversight.

  Fourth:
  This provision again demonstrates how DCF information may flow into:

  • healthcare,
  • developmental services,
  • and early childhood intervention systems.

  And strategically, while this subsection itself is not directly about homeschooling, it continues reinforcing the broader structural concern opponents raised:

  Once educational withdrawal becomes tied to DCF systems,
  families potentially become connected — directly or indirectly — to a vast network of:

  • educational,
  • medical,
  • judicial,
  • licensing,
  • social service,
  • and law enforcement infrastructures.

  Critics argue that level of institutional integration is disproportionate when triggered merely by the exercise of parental educational choice absent adjudicated abuse or neglect.

  ~~~~~~~

  PAGE 16
  (29) The Department of Public Health for
  (A) the purpose of notification when the Commissioner of Children and Families places an individual licensed or certified by the Department of Public Health on the child abuse and neglect registry established pursuant to section 17a 101k, and
  (B) purposes relating to the licensure of the Albert J. Solnit Children’s Center and the administration of licensing requirements established pursuant to or set forth in sections 19a-134 and 19a-498;

PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING: 

DCF records may be shared with the Connecticut Department of Public Health (DPH):

(A) when DCF places someone licensed or certified by DPH on the child abuse and neglect registry,

AND

(B) for licensing and regulatory purposes involving facilities such as the Albert J. Solnit Children’s Center and other healthcare-related licensing requirements.

In simple terms:

DCF can notify the Department of Public Health if someone working in a state-licensed health or child-related profession is placed on the abuse/neglect registry.

DCF and DPH can also share information connected to licensing and oversight of certain child-care or treatment facilities.

Standing alone, this is fairly standard professional licensing and child-safety oversight language.

If someone works in a licensed healthcare or child-services field, the state may want licensing authorities notified about serious child abuse findings.

Now, some important observations.

First:
This subsection again demonstrates how DCF registry information can affect:

• professional licenses,
• employment,
• certifications,
• and regulatory standing.

Second:
The statute again ties disclosure authority directly to the child abuse and neglect registry.

That registry repeatedly appears throughout the bill as a central mechanism for:

• suitability determinations,
• licensing oversight,
• employment screening,
• and interagency notification.

Third:
Subsection (B) reflects broader coordination between:

• DCF,
• healthcare regulators,
• and child-service facility oversight systems.

Fourth:
This subsection is another example of how DCF information moves into systems far beyond traditional abuse investigations themselves.

It may affect:

• healthcare licensing,
• institutional regulation,
• educational systems,
• social services,
• courts,
• law enforcement,
• and employment structures.

And strategically, in the context of the homeschooling bill, critics would likely continue emphasizing the cumulative pattern:

The bill repeatedly integrates:

• educational administration,
• DCF systems,
• registry systems,
• licensing systems,
• and interagency disclosure frameworks.

Opponents argue that once homeschooling withdrawal becomes tied to DCF involvement, ordinary educational-choice families risk being pulled into infrastructures designed primarily for:

• abuse prevention,
• professional oversight,
• institutional regulation,
• and governmental intervention systems.

~~~~~~~

PAGE 16
(30) The Department of Correction, for the purpose of determining the supervision and treatment needs of a child or youth, and providing appropriate supervision and treatment services to such child or youth;

PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING:

DCF records may be shared with the Connecticut Department of Correction (DOC) when needed to:

• determine what kind of supervision or treatment a child or youth needs,
  and
• provide appropriate supervision or treatment services.

In simple terms:

If a child or youth becomes involved with the correctional system, DCF information may be shared to help decide:

• supervision,
• rehabilitation,
• treatment,
• or support services.

Standing alone, this is fairly standard interagency coordination language between:

• child welfare systems,
  and
• correctional/juvenile justice systems.

Now, some important observations.

First:
This subsection again demonstrates how DCF records can move into yet another major governmental system:
the correctional system.

That is significant because it shows how broadly connected DCF information-sharing infrastructure is.

Second:
The wording:
“child or youth”
suggests this primarily concerns juvenile or young-offender populations rather than ordinary adult prison administration.

Third:
The phrase:
“supervision and treatment needs”
is broad.

That can include:

• behavioral services,
• rehabilitation planning,
• mental health support,
• placement decisions,
• or correctional supervision structures.

Fourth:
This subsection further reinforces the recurring theme throughout all these disclosure provisions:

Once information enters DCF systems,
there are numerous authorized pathways into:

• courts,
• prosecutors,
• law enforcement,
• licensing systems,
• social services,
• healthcare systems,
• juvenile justice,
• and correctional systems.

And strategically, in the context of the homeschooling bill, critics focus not on this subsection by itself, but on the cumulative architecture.

Opponents repeatedly argued:

The earlier educational provisions:

• tied homeschooling withdrawal to DCF screening,
• authorized educational-record sharing,
• and integrated parent-managed-learning into state tracking systems.

Once that connection exists, families potentially become linked — directly or indirectly — to an enormous institutional network associated with:

• investigations,
• judicial systems,
• supervision structures,
• and governmental intervention frameworks.

Critics argue that level of entanglement is fundamentally disproportionate for families merely exercising parental educational rights absent adjudicated abuse or neglect.

~~~~~~~

PAGE 16
(31) Any child placing agency subject to licensure by the Department of Children and Families, for the purpose of determining the suitability of a person
(A) for employment by such agency, or
(B) to adopt or provide foster care pursuant to sections 17a-114 and 17a-151;

PLAIN LANGUAGE MEANING: 

DCF records may be shared with child-placing agencies licensed by DCF in order to determine whether someone is suitable:

(A) to work for the agency,

OR

(B) to adopt a child or become a foster parent.

In simple terms:

Adoption agencies and foster care agencies can receive DCF information when evaluating:

• employees,
• adoptive parents,
• or foster parents.

Standing alone, this is fairly standard child welfare licensing and placement language.

Agencies responsible for placing children generally conduct extensive screening to assess:

• safety,
• suitability,
• background history,
• and caregiving fitness.

Now, some important observations.

First:
This subsection again shows how DCF information affects:

• employment,
• licensing,
• foster care,
• and adoption suitability determinations.

Second:
The phrase:
“determining the suitability”
is broad discretionary language.

That typically allows agencies to evaluate whether someone is appropriate to work with or care for children.

Third:
This subsection further reinforces how central DCF records and registry systems are within Connecticut’s broader child-services infrastructure.

By now, DCF information may potentially intersect with:

• educational systems,
• courts,
• prosecutors,
• law enforcement,
• healthcare agencies,
• licensing systems,
• correctional systems,
• foster/adoptive agencies,
• and social services.

Fourth:
Standing alone, this provision is not specifically about homeschooling.

BUT —
in the context of the earlier educational sections, critics argue it contributes to the broader institutional picture.

Namely:
once educational withdrawal becomes tied to DCF systems,
families potentially become connected to a child welfare infrastructure originally designed for:

• abuse investigations,
• foster care oversight,
• adoption screening,
• and governmental child-placement systems.

And strategically, opponents would likely continue emphasizing the same core constitutional concern:

The bill repeatedly treats ordinary educational-choice families through frameworks associated with:

• suitability determinations,
• child protection screening,
• and governmental oversight systems —

rather than treating homeschooling primarily as a protected parental liberty interest under cases such as:

• Pierce v. Society of Sisters
• Meyer v. Nebraska

~~~~~~~

PAGE 16
(32) The Department of Administrative Services, for the purpose of determining whether an applicant for employment with the state, who would have contact with children in the course of such employment, appears on the child abuse or neglect registry maintained pursuant to section 17a-101k;